𝗔𝗦𝗞𝗜𝗡𝗚 𝗧𝗛𝗘 𝗥𝗜𝗚𝗛𝗧 𝗤𝗨𝗘𝗦𝗧𝗜𝗢𝗡𝗦

In any discussion on morality, only morally relevant questions are admissible, and not just any answerable question. Such an irrelevant question has been asked to me in a discussion on abortion, which was: When does human life commence? I have already addressed a similar question in detail here so I will only answer this question as briefly as possible.

The question may have at least the following four correct but different answers (which, as expressed, at the very least makes the question useless), and only the fourth one is relevant to the abortion question. The answers I have in mind are:

1. Human life started when humanity evolved from our closest evolutionary ancestral species, although this did not happen at a particular point in time but was a gradual process. Anyone with at least a basic understanding of evolution will know this fact to be true.

2. Human life starts when the sperm leaves the male human to meet the female.

3. Human life starts at fertilisation.

4. Human life starts when the foetus attains a sufficiently developed brain that gives it the capacity to experience and to build an identity through time and experience, and when others' actions may affect it and be either beneficial or harmful to it as an experiential individual. Objects or bodies lacking a brain, or a sufficiently developed brain that enables them to have experiences, do not experience anything at all. The fact that a being with a sufficiently developed brain can experience the world, and can experience other people's actions that may benefit or harm it, is what makes that being, and only such beings, morally relevant.

Only answer four is morally relevant since only it adequately and sufficiently addresses the moral issue that is in question. So the proper morally relevant question would be "What makes one a moral subject?" And the short answer would be "the capacity to experience and be harmed".

I should also clarify that our humanity is neither a sufficient (for reasons already given) nor an exclusive fact. In fact, it is for example morally wrong to kick a dog, because a dog, like a sentient human, can also suffer. An early to mid-term foetus, on the other hand, does not experience anything.

If you answer the question "Why is it morally wrong to kick a dog but not morally wrong to kick a rock?", you will notice that this is because a dog can experience the world and therefore may suffer consequences, while a rock cannot. It is the brain that makes this fundamental difference. The reply would remain the same even if the rock you kick could potentially magically become a dog in the future. Potentiality is not a relevant factor, neither here nor in the case of a foetus that presently cannot experience anything but might only have the potential of becoming an experiential person in the future.

For an argument to be valid and not just prejudiced opinion, it should be applicable to relevantly similar cases. Therefore, if you accept that a dog has rights that a rock does not have because the former can experience while the latter does not experience anything, the same must apply in the case of a non-sentient foetus. Objecting by claiming that the foetus is "human" is not enough, since it begs the question: What is it that makes being human morally relevant? The answer, to avoid being circular, must be other than "because they are human".

See also: 𝗛𝗢𝗪 𝗖𝗔𝗡 𝗬𝗢𝗨 𝗕𝗘 𝗣𝗥𝗢-𝗖𝗛𝗢𝗜𝗖𝗘 𝗔𝗡𝗗 𝗙𝗢𝗥 𝗔𝗡𝗜𝗠𝗔𝗟 𝗥𝗜𝗚𝗛𝗧𝗦? 𝗛𝗢𝗪 𝗖𝗔𝗡 𝗬𝗢𝗨 𝗖𝗢𝗡𝗗𝗢𝗡𝗘 𝗧𝗛𝗘 𝗞𝗜𝗟𝗟𝗜𝗡𝗚 𝗢𝗙 "𝗛𝗨𝗠𝗔𝗡 𝗕𝗔𝗕𝗜𝗘𝗦" 𝗕𝗨𝗧 𝗡𝗢𝗧 𝗧𝗛𝗘 𝗞𝗜𝗟𝗟𝗜𝗡𝗚 𝗢𝗙 𝗔𝗡𝗜𝗠𝗔𝗟𝗦?

First published on Facebook on 28 December 2022.