𝗧𝗛𝗘 𝗗𝗡𝗔 𝗙𝗔𝗟𝗟𝗔𝗖𝗬 – 𝗔 𝗦𝗖𝗜𝗘𝗡𝗧𝗜𝗙𝗜𝗖-𝗣𝗛𝗜𝗟𝗢𝗦𝗢𝗣𝗛𝗜𝗖𝗔𝗟 𝗣𝗘𝗥𝗦𝗣𝗘𝗖𝗧𝗜𝗩𝗘

Mariana Debono, portraying herself as an “independent researcher” (and actually being a Catechesis Pastoral Officer within the Maltese Catholic Church), penned an article in The Malta Independent of Sunday 11 December claiming that she “makes recourse to the most pertinent scientific research to show that...pro-abortion claims are, for some reason or other, fallacious”. It is riddled with half-truths, inaccuracies, non-sequiturs and irrelevancies that make the whole article at best naïve and at worst deceptive, as I will show.

Ms Debono starts off on the wrong foot (giving us a presentiment of what is to come) with the half-truth that the foetus is an autonomous body and not an “organ” that is part of the woman’s body. While, as she correctly claims, the foetus has different DNA from the mother, and each embryo, as she also correctly claims, has a full genetic code that is distinct from that of the mother (although not necessarily unique, distinct and unrepeatable as she claims, as I will show in a moment), the embryo or foetus is not autonomous, which in the relevant sense means “existing or capable of existing independently”. In fact, a foetus is generally considered viable, that is, could be capable of living independently of the mother, at around 23 or 24 weeks. So, prior to 23 weeks, a foetus, while certainly distinct from the pregnant woman, is not an autonomous body. Moreover, the claim that the foetal DNA is necessarily unique, distinct and unrepeatable is falsified by the existence of identical twins who share the same DNA. If it was unique DNA that made us a person, then identical twins would have to be considered as one individual, and not two, with all the absurd consequences (especially in criminal law) that would follow.

DNA is just an “information code” whose function is to build and maintain a body, and while its importance should not be underestimated, it is not what defines us. It is not what gives us personal identity. It is our brain that gives us our unique personal identity and enables us to have all kinds of experiences, desires, and interests, attributes that make a body a person and differentiate it from simply living flesh. It is precisely what sets plants in a different class from animals (including humans). Lacking a sufficiently developed brain, a body couldn’t even care whether it exists or not (just like plants don’t) or even whether it would eventually develop into a sentient, conscious and thinking person. As the Scientific American says, “Consciousness requires a sophisticated network of highly interconnected components, nerve cells. Its physical substrate, the thalamo-cortical complex that provides consciousness with its highly elaborate content, begins to be in place between the 24th and the 28th week of gestation”.

Ms Debono then stretches the meaning of the term “autonomous” to breaking point by claiming that “simply because the foetus depends upon the mother for nourishment and shelter, it does not follow that the foetus is not autonomous. After all, as ‘birthed’ humans, we depend upon the environment, food, shelter, etc., however, we do not regard this ‘dependence’ as depriving us from our individual autonomy”. Her example, far from proving that an early to mid-term foetus is autonomous, would seem to suggest that no one is truly autonomous (a philosophically arguable point, but which would defeat her argument on personal autonomy). Autonomy, in its well defined and accepted meaning, does not absolve anyone from the laws of cause and effect, and if we were to use autonomy in the sense that Ms Debono disingeniously suggests, the term becomes useless. While it is true that autonomous individuals depend on an infinite number of environmental factors, the attribute that distinguishes autonomous from non-autonomous beings is the capacity of desiring and acting on those desires, which again requires a sufficiently developed brain.

Ms Debono confuses being human with being a person, insisting on the fact that embryos from the moment of fertilisation “receive human DNA”. I have already shown how DNA by itself is morally irrelevant given that a body with human DNA but lacking a sufficiently developed brain has no experiences, desires, and interests, and by implication, no rights (it would be absurd to talk of rights if a body, whether human or not, lacks interests). Moreover, taking the argument to its ridiculous extremes, one should note that it is a scientific fact that even human sperm has "unique" human DNA. In fact, the presence of sperm and semen can be important in a crime investigation in providing evidence in cases of suspected rape. So if having human DNA were sufficient for having rights (especially the right to life), we would be morally compelled to lifelong celibacy given that every sexual act kills on average at least 200 million sperm. A genocide for the sake of possibly one child!

But to stress the point even further, and keeping in mind that on moral issues, science without philosophy is useless just as philosophy without science is, I shall offer the following thought experiment: Suppose brain transplants are possible. Suppose further that your brain is healthy, but your body will die in a few days. Suppose that your doctor tells you that there is another person with a healthy body but whose brain is dying in a few days, and it is possible (and the other person is willing) to perform a brain transplant. The operation is performed, and your brain is transplanted in the other person’s body. The operation is successful. Are you still alive, or are you dead? If it is DNA that makes you an individual person, you are now dead (or mostly dead, if you wish to be pedantic). If it is your brain (with all its experiences, desires and interests) that makes you an individual person, then you are still alive. From this it follows that it is your brain that makes you a person. A living body lacking a sufficiently developed and functioning brain is just that – a living body with or without the potential of becoming a person.

Ms Debono then says that Dr Carter Snead, a "renowned bioethics expert" says that the embryo “directs herself along the developmental trajectory that is specie specific”. She goes on to quote Dr Maureen Condic who says that “the cells, tissues and organs produced during development do not somehow ‘generate’ the embryo (as if there were some unseen, mysterious ‘manufacturer’ directing this process), they are produced by the embryo as it directs its own development to more mature stages of human life”, and that “this ‘coordinated behaviour’ directed autonomously, is the defining characteristic of a human organism”. Ms Debono is either being naïve or dishonest, as are the two medics she quotes (unless they are being misquoted or quoted out of context). Perhaps we do not share the same dictionary and our meaning of the terms “to direct” and “autonomy” differ. Maybe Ms Debono should explain how an embryo or an early to mid-term foetus lacking a fully functioning brain could will anything to enable it to “direct” anything, let alone autonomously, unless she/they are stretching the meaning of “directs itself” to be something akin to saying that a plant “grows itself” (but of course without intent). But that would defeat her whole purpose and argument.

Ms Debono then says: “in light of the fact that embryos and foetuses are in fact ‘living human organisms’, the question pertaining to the nature of human rights presents itself. If they are human, why shouldn’t they be eligible to the same rights which even the most vulnerable, dependent, and biologically impaired humans in our society are?”. She correctly states that “a human is not eligible to rights because of the environment they find themselves in: i.e. because they are either in or outside the womb”. However, her claim that “rights first and foremost depend upon the nature of the specie – in this case the human species” is not entirely true, as I will show. She goes on to say that “the only criterion which needs to be ticked is the criterion of humanity, not the criterion of whether the lungs or the heart have formed, or whether the human can think or speak”.

Let us disregard the fact that her criterion would exclude all other animal species, which in turn would mean that “cruelty to animals” would be a meaningless term (if non-human animals do not have at least a right against cruelty, one would be morally permitted to do with them anything they want). Even if we were to focus only on the human species, her claim would lead to the absurd conclusion that it would be morally impermissible to sever any human body part (even if medically required) since each part of our body has a complete set of our DNA and is alive. Using her argument, who are we to decide which part of our body gets to live, and which doesn’t? My answer would be that it is up to the brain to decide. Her answer would be left hanging, since she attributes rights to any body (and by implication, any body part) with human DNA, even if it lacks a brain.

I have already shown how the criterion for having rights must be the one of whether a living being has experiences, desires, and interests – attributes which require a sufficiently developed brain that only develops between the 24th and the 28th week of gestation. It is our brain that gives us a personal identity that builds up through sensory and intellectual experience. One could sensibly only talk of having rights when speaking of individuals who have interests. A body lacking a sufficiently developed brain lacks any interests. It may only have the potential of becoming a person with interests, and therefore, rights.

Ms Debono writes that “we uncontestably ascribe ‘rights’ to humans who can’t speak, think, who are brain-dead, etc”. If she really thinks the claim that rights apply to the brain-dead is incontestable, then she must have not read much philosophy. But let’s start with the definition of brain death. Brain death (also known as brain stem death) is when someone on an artificial life support machine no longer has any brain functions. This means they will not regain consciousness or be able to breathe without support. Someone who is brain dead is legally confirmed as dead. The only sense in which a dead human can be said to have any rights is in order to respect their pre-death wishes (if known) or to respect the wishes of close relatives. If Ms Debono thinks the issue of “rights” of dead people is settled, I would invite her to read some of the vast literature on what is termed “the non-identity problem”. The only valid criterion for having rights is the presence of having interests. Interests are not possible without any kind of experiences (both in the sentience and consciousness senses). A body lacking a living sufficiently developed brain cannot have any experiences. The conclusion from this is obvious.

Ms Debono says that “scientifically, the embryo should be described as a human that is simply developing: just as a toddler is a human despite still developing! ‘Foetus’ is a term that marks a stage in human development – it does not mark a stage of an organism that is yet to become human”. While this is obviously true, the fundamental difference between an embryo or early to mid-term foetus and a toddler is that a foetus, while human, is only a human body in the early stages of development that only has the potential of becoming a sentient experiential human, while a toddler (or even a late-term foetus) is already a sentient experiential human with interests. Ms Debono goes on to say that “some go on to argue that although the embryo is a ‘living human’, they are not a ‘person’: and therefore should not be allowed ‘equal’ rights as the woman (i.e. here the assumption is that human rights depend upon personhood, not humanity – it is also assumed (yet scientifically unprovable) that there is a difference between the two)”. My arguments above have shown that not only does an embryo not have equal rights as the woman, but an embryo lacking any interests (because lacking a sufficiently developed brain to give it any experiences at all), effectively has no rights at that stage of development.

A potential person is not an actual person who has interests, desires, etc. If Ms Debono really thinks there is no moral difference between a body that lacks interests and a person with a sufficiently developed brain that enables the perception of experiences that include pleasure and pain and which is a requisite for having any desires at all, then her claim that the difference between “humanity” and personhood is “yet scientifically unprovable” only stems from her lack of sufficient knowledge on both the science and the philosophy. She sees this “framework” (the requisite of an experiential welfare for having rights) as problematic because she says that “it brings with it questions which science, by nature, is unable to address” and that the question of “when does personhood begin” is a philosophical question. When does personhood begin is indeed a philosophical question. What Ms Debono seems to overlook is that good philosophy is one that is informed by good science. Science already tells us (with more than enough evidence) that “consciousness with its highly elaborate content, begins to be in place between the 24th and the 28th week of gestation”.

I will conclude by quoting from the School of Medicine of the University of Missouri, which unequivocally states that “the moral sense of personhood denotes individual beings who are moral agents. Moral agents engage in behaviour that can be evaluated as moral or immoral, as morally right or wrong, as morally permissible or morally impermissible. Their acts are blameworthy or praiseworthy. It makes sense to hold them morally responsible for their intentional actions…Moral personhood might also be held to include, in a very loose sense, being a moral patient, that is, a being who can suffer at the hands of wrong actions by moral agents. Moral agents are usually moral patients, and some use the term ‘moral agent’ to include moral patiency. But being a moral patient is distinct from being a moral actor, and nonhuman animals as well as humans are held to be moral patients”. Pre-sentient foetuses are neither moral agents nor moral patients, and by implication, not persons in the relevant sense. Lacking a sufficiently developed brain, they are incapable of experiencing anything. Thus, they cannot be harmed.

Ms Debono needs to do much more research, both in science and philosophy. Let me recommend a few useful books:

Steven Pinker - How the Mind Works

Steven Pinker - The Blank Slate

Dick Swaab - We Are Our Brains

Derek Parfit - Reasons and Persons

Thomas Nagel - Mortal Questions

David Boonin - The Non-Identity Problem & the Ethics of Future People

David Boonin - A Defense of Abortion

Bonnie Steinbock - Life Before Birth

First published on Facebook on 15 December 2022.