THE RIGHT TO LIFE OF AN INDIVIDUAL

Michael Asciak, replying to my opinion piece published in The Times of Malta on January 16, says that “the science of embryology tells us that the human being begins at conception” and that I “mistakenly assume that the right to life of a human being, which is protected by the constitution, should not pertain to the physical body but should be accorded to the time the foetus acquires consciousness”.

That the life of a human being starts at conception is a fact I never disputed. That personhood begins with consciousness, awareness and sentience is something I have argued for, and on which I have never yet seen a convincing counter-argument that does not rely on faith or prejudiced assumptions. As to the protection the constitution supposedly affords to pre-sentient foetuses (it doesn’t – it only affords protection to born humans), I will not dwell on that point given that constitutions, like laws, can change, and one cannot logically bring up the illegality of something when that illegality is the thing that is being contested. If this were not the case, slavery would still be legal, and it would have remained legal had legislators argued that slavery should be legal because it is legal.

Asciak then asks me to tell him how I intend to identify the (exact) point in time when the foetus develops consciousness. This of course is a tired old argument that clearly stems from thoughtlessness, which is surprising coming from a senior lecturer. 

We draw a semi-arbitrary line when, for instance, we decide when children become adults. We may decide, for instance, that only people who are at least 18 years old may be permitted to drive, even though some 17-year-olds may be mentally more capable of driving safely than some adults much older than that. Asciak’s question would seem to suggest that since we cannot determine the exact point when any person mentally becomes an adult, we should either let anyone drive, or let no one drive at all. This is just one example out of many where we have to draw a semi-arbitrary line. In the case of sentience and consciousness and when to allow abortion, given that both only start to develop between the 24^th and the 28^th week of gestation, I would perhaps err on the side of caution, and allow it only at 23 weeks. I wonder what Asciak would say about this. I suspect he will be none-too-happier about it, and that his question is just a feeble excuse that ignores both the concept of pragmatically drawing a sensible line whenever practical cases may vary, and the concept of erring on the side of caution to prevent the harming of marginal cases.

Asciak then goes on to mention Peter Singer and Helga Kuhse, saying that they believe that consciousness is not enough to protect the foetus, and that they hold that this should be extended to self-consciousness, which occurs between two to three years of age. Asciak is correct in saying that by this they would be allowing for infanticide (although, to be fair, I know for a fact that at least Singer gives other arguments against infanticide). However, given that I am neither Singer nor Kuhse, and given that I have never made such an argument, Asciak is here only creating a straw man to beat. A senior lecturer should know better than that.

Asciak then says that “the human mind is not a physical attribute, like the brain, but incorporates attributes of the spirit and, therefore, enters the unknown parameters of the soul and metaphysics”. Asciak adds that “a spirit is immeasurably immaterial and that leaves us empirically only with the physical attribute of the body, which we can measure”. From this, Asciak concludes that “since in science we only have the empirical evidence of the human body to identify physically and deal with, that is where we have to provide legal protection”.

The belief in souls that enter a body at conception is just a faith-based belief lacking any evidence, and therefore may be disregarded unless one is of the opinion that religious beliefs should be imposed through legislation. As for a proper discussion on metaphysics, this would have to take several hours or even days of discussion. I’m currently midway through reading Schopenhauer’s second volume of “The World as Will and Representation”. If it has taken Shopenhauer at least two volumes to expound his thoughts on metaphysics, neither Asciak nor I could be expected to address the topic in a few lines. However, for my purposes, it is sufficient for me to say the following:

Science tells us that consciousness is an emergent property of the brain resulting from the communication of information across all its regions. Whether anything beyond or prior to this exists (such as a soul) is, and cannot be other than, mere speculation. All the evidence points to personal identity being a product of the brain that creates this individual identity through mental continuity (by means of memory) through time. However, even if we were to concede (despite the lack of any evidence) the existence of souls or any like immaterial “substance”, Asciak would be hard-pressed to give any evidence that the soul enters the body at conception, and not, for instance, at 24 weeks or so. Should we ask him to give us the exact time (in milliseconds) when a soul enters a body? And even then, Asciak cannot say, because he cannot know, whether or how an immaterial soul prior to the body attaining sentience and consciousness, may care whether it ceases to occupy a human body due to abortion. Is the “immaterial soul” left hanging? (and in that case, why or how could it care); does it enter a different body? (again, why or how would it care); does it enter a heavenly place? (in that case, wouldn’t it be benefited?). Asciak does not say. What is sure is that if a soul exists independently of a body, it cannot cease to exist when a body dies. Asciak has all the work cut out for him to explain (preferably with evidence) how abortion would affect the immaterial “soul”. I wish him luck. Perhaps where all others have failed, he will succeed.

Asciak then tells us that “it is not DNA, which is just a chemical, that determines protection but the DNA within the constantly changing and active…human organism in which DNA remains a constant fixture…”. So essentially, Asciak is saying that it is not DNA that determines protection, but DNA – a logical contradiction.

Asciak then proceeds to inform us that in his long experience as a physician, he has been entrusted with the life of human beings who have no consciousness, and one never proceeds to terminate that life. Asciak should know that this is only because we recognize the fact that people in a coma are persons who have built a continuous identity over time, which the scientific evidence points to starting at 24 weeks gestation, so we generally assume (because we too have mental life) that the person who temporarily cannot communicate with us would most probably wish to live on. This, by definition, would not apply to pre-conscious foetuses who cannot have any desires or interests at all. 

I have already dealt briefly with the issue of bodiless “souls”, so I won’t repeat myself here. Asciak simply tells us that reason dictates that we protect and maintain the life of any being just because its DNA shows it belongs to the human species. I claim that only beings with a personal identity who have an individual experiential welfare can have rights. Rights only apply to actual persons, not potential ones. I have made my case for my claims both here and in Potential Adam and Potential Eve, The Ghost in the Machine, and elsewhere. Asciak has only provided us with faith-based assertions.

Asciak then writes: “Cassar even makes the wrong assertion that the DNA of identical twins is the same, conveniently ignoring the fact that, although the DNA structure is the same, the functioning expression of this DNA as determined by the acquired different epigenetics of both identical twins means that the DNA in both twins is expressed very differently”. Once again, Asciak gets his thinking muddled and tells another logical contradiction. He says that I make the wrong assertion that the DNA of identical twins is the same, and then says that the DNA structure is indeed the same, thereby showing that I was correct all along. 

Asciak prejudicially assumes I do not know that DNA in twins is expressed differently (that much is obvious - for this not to be so they would have to eternally occupy the same space-time, and this is an impossibility), and he is already set in his mind that I must be wrong (hence his logical contradictions) because he completely misunderstands the simple point I wished to make and makes more of it than I actually said or implied. My only undeniable point when mentioning DNA was that it cannot be DNA in or by itself that makes us unique persons, otherwise identical twins would have to be considered as either two or half a person each. Perhaps it would have helped if Asciak would have read the opinion piece I was replying to before replying to my own as if it was written in isolation and not as a response to someone else's claims.

Asciak then asserts – yet again without any evidence or argument – that “an individual human being of species Homo Sapiens is an individual entity of a species that is, by its very nature rational, and therefore merits the terminology of a person…”. Except that this is clearly not the case. Foetuses cannot by any stretch of the imagination be considered rational, and rationality is only attained gradually during infancy, if at all. I will just mention in passing that Asciak's claim that humans are by nature rational would seem to suggest that severely mentally disabled people who never attain rationality are perhaps not human at all. They cannot be if to be human is to be rational. This of course is not what I believe, and neither is it what Asciak believes. It just goes to show that half-baked arguments can lead to dangerous conclusions.

That said, I never bound the right to life to rationality – yet another straw man. I bind the right to life to sentience, consciousness, and a personal identity built over time, and I have argued my case for this claim. Asciak has failed to even start addressing his.

Asciak concludes by saying that “to castigate a religious belief which is based on scientific fact…” (it isn't - there is no scientific evidence for “souls” on the assumption of which he bases his entire article), “shows the ridiculous bellicosity of those who rubbish both science and religion, because the Church’s current position is a position based on current scientific fact not myth”. Asciak should note that verbosity doesn’t impress me at all. All I’m interested in is evidence and convincing reasoned arguments that do not rely on faith. He failed to provide either. He says that “ultimately faith and reason support each other” when he should know that faith is beliefs people hold despite lack of evidence, otherwise faith would be redundant. He should also note that there is no claim that cannot be asserted by faith alone. Faith will only appeal to the holders of that faith, and no one else.

Asciak has failed to illuminate us on the evidence that supports the belief in an immaterial soul that not only exists but can actually be harmed. I won’t hold my breath. He says that “science tells us that human life begins at fertilization”, which is true, but fails to argue with evidence for his claim that “the moral reason tells us that life must be protected (from conception)". Again, I don’t expect him to, given that his morality is dependent on his faith, not reason and evidence. He is entitled to his religious faith, but religious faith should never be imposed.