INEXISTANT "PERSONS" CANNOT BE HARMED

On February 13, in response to a letter to the Editor from Charles Pace (The Times of Malta, February 4) I wrote a reply as my own letter to the Editor, stating that prior to having a sufficiently developed brain (at least at 24 weeks), a person does not exist at all and, therefore, cannot have interests, preferences or desires because there would be no one to have them. I concluded that at that stage, an organism is only a body with the potential of becoming a person with any interests, and therefore, rights. I further claimed that Pace missed the point of my letter, being that a personal identity necessarily requires a mental life which cannot be possible without a developed brain. Pace replied on February 22 saying that he did not miss my point. He simply disagrees with it. It would have helped if Pace were to read my full reply of February 9 in my blog like I suggested in my letter, but I will address some of his points here.

Pace tells us that “if you kill me as an embryo you are killing me because DNA shows the embryo and I are the same organism, the same living being”. This simply repeats the mistake of conflating biological humanity (or any species for that matter) with a personal identity, which is what actually matters morally. Pace fails to argue for his assertion that DNA or species membership, by itself, is morally relevant. He just takes it as a given.

Pace next tells us that if whoever is unconscious has no right to life, we can kill anybody when asleep or anaesthetized. Pace would be correct if that were the actual claim I make. That would be an oversimplification of what I actually mean, which is the following: A personal identity with interests develops incrementally and gradually with the emergence of a sufficiently developed brain. This property of the brain is what gives us the ability to have preferences and desires, even if only rudimentary ones like the seeking of pleasure and the avoidance of pain or a willingness to do so. Lacking a brain, a body has no interests at all, but may only have the potential of developing into a person with interests. Someone who is temporarily unconscious, such as the people in the examples Pace gives, would still have a mental history of interests, preferences and desires – a personality. Moreover, irrespective of whether one can or does explicitly express it or not, we are justified in assuming that a person who is temporarily unconscious would have a preference for continued existence. Not so in the case of a pre-sentient foetus that as yet lacks a brain capable of having any desires at all, and cannot even care whether it exists or not.

Pace then says that “it is not the state of consciousness that gives us the worth and dignity but our capability to be conscious at a rational and spiritual level”. I’ll ignore the “spiritual” given that Pace did not define it and that it could mean different things to different people. It is sufficient for me to point out that pre-sentient foetuses, unlike persons who are temporarily unconscious, do not have the capability to be conscious at a rational level, but only have a possibility of developing into such a person. In their pre-sentient stage, they have no personal identity as I define it, being a personality with interests and desires however rudimentary, that is acquired progressively and developed continuously over time. My claim that it is only beings with personal interests and desires who may have the right to have those interests respected is logical. Pace’s claim that species membership or DNA is sufficient is just an arbitrary assertion that he proposes without supporting it with any rational argument.

Pace says that “human rights are not the privileges folder of paying members of a self-serving club whose main perk is its being exclusive. These are privileges we share with all those who have the same capabilities”. Pace is of course correct (although I would personally change the word “privileges” to “rights”. However he is incorrect when he says that “It is just normal nature for embryos to have the capability of rational consciousness, a capability that is already there”. Like I already said, pre-sentient embryos do not have the capability of rational consciousness. They might only have the potential of developing into persons with that capability, if even that. This makes them beings who do not have the same capabilities, contrary to what Pace asserts.

Pace then says that, like Karl Popper, he acknowledges the evidence that the human mind operates with a certain autonomy from the body, and that “our spiritual mind not only interacts with our body but it often also overrides simple body inclinations, in a mind-over-body manner”. He adds that, like Fenwick, he acknowledges the “evidence” that “human consciousness and perception can happen independently of our body organs – such as when people see what is away from their eyes in near-death and other experiences”.

The evidence from neurological experiments and study of victims of severe brain injury point to consciousness being an emergent property of the brain, resulting from the communication of information across all its regions. No evidence at all, as far as I know, supports the hypothesis of an immaterial soul preceding the development of a brain and surviving its eventual demise. All that near-death experiences can tell us, as studies have shown, is that a surge of electrical activity in the brain could be responsible for the vivid experiences described by near-death survivors. And contrary to what Pace asserts, there is no reliable evidence at all that people undergoing a near-death experience may see hidden objects at all.

Pace asks how one can claim that one knows there is no humanity in the early unborn and that there is no spiritual component that is not already operating with its own autonomy”. I never claimed the early foetus has no humanity, if by humanity we simply mean being members of the human species. My arguments revolve around the issue of personhood. However, Pace here shifts the burden of proof. It is up to the ones who claim the existence of immaterial souls to support their claim with evidence. Pace provides none. And even if he succeeds where all others have failed, he would still be hard-pressed to explain evidentially how it could even matter to an “immaterial soul” whether it is permitted to inhabit or remain in a body, or what happens to it when the body it inhabits dies, or if we are to assume a heaven where all innocent souls ultimately go to, how it is not preferable for particular souls to go there sooner rather than later. But in any case, the belief in immaterial souls is a “religious” belief irrespective of what one wishes to call it, which, unless it is supported by evidence that makes it morally relevant, should not be imposed.

Pace concludes by asking whether children who do not understand death before age four may be killed because they do not understand death. The answer is clearly no, because death is the complete frustration of all pursuance of any and all interests and desires, irrespective of whether one understands the concept of death. And the right to pursuance of any kind of interests, including but not limited to the seeking of pleasure and the avoidance of pain, as well as the enjoyment of life, only applies to persons who can have such interests. A foetus lacking a sufficiently developed brain can have no interest in continued existence at all, let alone the pursuance of any other interests. Children evidently do.