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As the abortion “debate” in Malta rages on, some are making the claim that the pro-life position is not necessarily a religious position but is backed by science. My position is that moral issues should be based on a sound and rationally consistent philosophy that is backed by science. Any preconceived opinion that is not backed by rational arguments applicable to relevantly similar cases is just prejudice and may be dismissed as such. Good philosophy that is supported by good science necessarily questions everything, even our deeply held beliefs and opinions. At this point I would advise those who would be offended by the questioning and examining of their deeply held beliefs to stop reading. Those with an open mind may read on.
So where do I begin? The pro-life position states that life begins at conception. I would argue that life begins even before that. After all, sperm is very much alive, and can live for up to five days, and if frozen, even for decades. But let’s not be pedantic and start with conception.
Pro-lifers argue that since human life begins at conception, abortion is never permissible. But what makes being human or being alive so special to warrant protection through rights? Claiming that human life must be protected because it is human is no argument at all (or if anything, a circular argument). So is claiming (although this claim is thankfully seldom made) that life must be protected because “all life is sacred”. This second claim would protect all forms of life, including plants. If this were true, cutting grass would be committing murder. Remember that any preconceived opinion that is not backed by rational arguments applicable to relevantly similar cases is just prejudice.
So, what makes human life special and deserving protection for its own sake, and grass life not special at all and not deserving equal protection also for its own sake? If we are to recognise as prejudice the granting of rights to humans just because they are humans (and exclude plants from having the same right to life despite also being alive), we must look for other reasons that justify our giving them differential treatment.
I would start by arguing that it only makes sense to speak of granting rights to individuals to whom those rights matter and only rights that can be taken and acted upon. It doesn’t make sense, for instance, to say that humans have the right to live without breathing. Nor would it make sense to say that humans have the right to the existence of aliens in an unreachable galaxy. The former is impossible, while the latter doesn’t matter (except perhaps as a curious speculation).
For a right to be both possible and matter, the individual to whom the right is granted must be capable of having an experiential welfare that may fare better or worse. Without the capacity of experience, even a rudimentary one (both sensory and intellectual), whatever happens does not matter to the one at the receiving end of the action (although it may matter to others, but here we are speaking of rights of the individuals themselves). One cannot harm that which cannot be harmed.
If we take the above to be true, then it must necessarily follow that the only subjects for whom it is reasonable to assign rights would be the ones to whom these rights are both possible and matter. And since, as I have argued, for anything to matter to one, one must be capable of having an experiential welfare; and given further that the only subjects capable of having an experiential welfare are the ones who have a sufficiently developed brain (or an analogous natural or artificial organ if it is ever discovered or created) that makes it possible for one to have experiences (both sensory and intellectual) and desires; then it must necessarily follow that the only subjects of any rights must be the ones with a sufficiently developed brain that enables them to have an experiential welfare that may fare better or worse. Individuals or objects that lack both sensory and intellectual perception cannot even care what happens to them. And like I have already argued, rights are only applicable to individuals to whom the rights in question are both possible and matter.
I will concede that the above rests on the assumption (backed by scientific evidence) that our personal identity is both initiated and evolves through functions in our brain (I won’t go into the scientific evidence here – to anyone interested I would highly recommend reading Steven Pinker’s “How the Mind Works” and “The Blank Slate”, and Dick Swaab’s “We Are Our Brains). The only alternative, and an unproven and possibly unprovable one at that, would be the existence of souls – but apart from being a question of faith (which the people claiming the issue is not about religion cannot resort to), this creates more questions than it answers, such as: Do souls exist? When does ensoulment take place? Where do souls reside before entering a body? Where does a soul go after a body dies? Does an afterlife exist? Is it preferable for a soul to enter the afterlife sooner or later? Would abortion itself, far from being injurious to a soul, do it a favour by quickening its ascent into heavenly bliss? Of course, lacking any evidence, the answers to such questions would merely be speculation or just a matter of personal faith. It is entirely possible that they will remain forever so. But until those questions can be convincingly answered with good evidence, the only tenable position on abortion that excludes religious belief would be the pro-choice one.
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First published on Facebook on 16 December 2022.

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